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Abstract: The structures, behaviours and problems of governance in small states have always 
fascinated me. I attribute this fascination to the fact that I began my career of teaching and 
research in public administration in Tasmania, Australia's island state with its population of 
around half a million, and then had many opportunities to compare and contrast the 
Tasmanian system with those of other small and many much larger jurisdictions. Continuing 
that career in the Australian Capital Territory, a ‘quasi-state’ even smaller in population 
terms, provided other such opportunities and challenges. Drawing on this research 
experience, this paper looks first at the relationship between statehood and size. It then 
considers how a number of governance issues mostly related to structuring and operating the 
executive and legislative branches of government have been affected over the years by the 
smallness factor. The illustrations come mostly from jurisdictions that would loosely be 
regarded as belonging to the family of Westminster-style governments, however much that 
style has been adapted to accommodate the factor of smallness 
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Introduction: The relationship between statehood and size 
 
The relationship between statehood and size has always been ambivalent. Whatever 
connotations the notion of statehood has brought with it over the centuries, it is obvious that 
some of them have been shared by all states whether large or small. Equally obviously, 
however, small states have had some characteristics distinguishing them from the general run 
of (usually rather larger) states. 
 
It may come as a surprise that the conclusion Aristotle drew from his comparative study 
of the many Greek city-states (polises) existing in and around the third century BC remains 
even today an appropriate introduction to the study of small state governance: 
 
In large states, it is both possible and proper that a separate magistracy should be 
allotted to each separate function ... In small states, on the other hand, a large number 
of functions have to be accumulated in the hands of but a few persons... It is true that 
small states sometimes need the same magistracies, and the same laws about their 
tenure and duties, as large states. But it is also true that large states need their 
magistracies almost continuously, and small states only need theirs at long intervals. 
There is thus no reason why small states should not impose a number of duties 
simultaneously on their officers... [and] it is necessary, where the population is small, to 
turn magistrates into jacks-of-all-trades (Aristotle, in Barker translation 1946, pp. 195-
196).1  
                                               
1
 Aristotle’s concern with problems of coordination in complex governance systems – leading towards a theory 
of departmentalisation – was noted in March & Simon (1958, p. 22). 
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There have always been small states functioning alongside, and in various sorts of 
relationships with, larger ones. From the time of Aristotle until fairly recently, however, their 
governance styles and problems have not attracted much serious study. But that study has 
been developing as a subfield of public administration as the number of such states has grown 
dramatically over the past couple of generations (Thynne and Wettenhall, 2001). The subject 
communities have mostly, of course, long existed: what is new is that many of them have 
acquired the institutions of statehood as part of the break-up of empires in the period of post-
World War II decolonisation and, as small statehood has thus become better understood, 
other oddities such as the proverbial ‘little countries of Europe’ – Luxembourg, Monaco, 
Andorra, San Marino and Liechtenstein (AGS, 1969) – have also been recognised fully as 
states in their own right, often running to United Nations membership. 
  
In 2017, there were 193 members of the United Nations, 38 of them having 
populations of less than one million (Wikipedia, 2017a). The Commonwealth of Nations that 
has emerged from the old British Empire also has many of them, its 52-state membership in 
late 2007 including 22 with populations of less than one million (Wikipedia, 2017b). And 
these figures include only those with full formal sovereignty. When ‘quasi-states’ with 
meaningful self-governing systems, such as the associated states of New Zealand (Cooks, 
Niue), China's ‘special administrative regions’ (Hong Kong, Macau), or provinces and 
cantons within federal systems, are added, the number of small states is much larger.2 
 
Though it is only one of several possible defining characteristics, the population 
criterion has been used in many studies: it accepts that the category of small states generally 
includes only those with populations of one million or less (see discussion in Raadschelders, 
1992, p. 27). This is the criterion I use here.  
 
But it needs to be acknowledged that ‘small’ is a relative concept: it all depends on 
what the small unit is being compared with. Political scientists pursuing other interests can 
easily describe the Scandinavian states, Estonia, Australia, New Zealand and even Greece as 
small (e.g. Schwartz, 1994; Clesse & Knudsen, 1996; Goetschel, 1998); they are so in 
relation to e.g. the US, France, Germany or Russia. Uruguay, described as ‘the world’s first 
country to fully legalise the production, sale and consumption of marijuana’, has recently 
been called ‘this small South American nation’ (Miroff, 2017). Humorous travel writer PJ 
O’Rourke described even front-line states like Germany, Italy and Spain as ‘Euro-weenies ... 
dopey little countries and all their pokey borders’ (O’Rourke 1988, pp. 193, 194). 
 
At the turn of the century, an elected member of the Mongolian parliament classified 
her country (with 2.4 million people) as a ‘small jurisdiction ... although geographically 
large’ (Oyun, 1999). While it does not qualify under the criterion used here, this example 
draws attention to the fact that some states and territories that may be small in resident 
population are nevertheless large in land area. These include Greenland emerging from the 
status of a Danish colony; the (fairly new) self-governing Inuit territory of Nunavut within 
the Canadian federation; and Australia’s (rather older) Northern Territory. 
 
 
                                               
2
 The Australian Capital Territory justifies inclusion in these terms, even though – because it is also the federal 
capital – most Australians assert that it must never become a ‘state’ in the formal Australian constitutional 
sense. I have described it, for Australian purposes, as a ‘quasi-state’ (1998a), though it seems appropriate to 
point out that the domestic jurisdictions housing two other federal capitals (Vienna and Berlin) are treated as full 
states within their own systems (Rowat 1991, pp. 29, 33). 
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Applying this criterion of smallness, Raadschelders uses 1987 data to list 32 small 
states enjoying full sovereignty, 20 of them natural islands (1992, p. 30). However, the editor 
of the book in which her discussion appears presents a list which is much larger because it 
also contains non-sovereign territories (Baker, 1992, pp. 12-13). Baker acknowledges that he 
includes both ‘internally self-governing territories and territories that remain dependent’ (p. 
11). Neither list, however, includes ‘states’ (also known as provinces, cantons or prefectures) 
in federations, many of which have highly developed governmental systems with wide-
ranging functions, and some of which actually assert claims to sovereignty. 
 
At the other end of the small spectrum are the so-called ‘micro-states’, demonstrating 
again that it is all relative. This term has been used to denote three very small Pacific states 
with populations of under 10,000 (Wettenhall & Thynne, 1994). Maltese scholars see their 
own country in this light (Pirotta, 1996) though, in Pacific terms, Malta is relatively large; 
thus Warrington (1994, p. 130) refers to all states of under a million people as micro-states. 
Elsewhere, I find Singapore and Estonia described as ‘tiny’ (Lee, 1993; Abjorensen, 1998): 
Palauans, Nauruans and Tuvaluans are likely to be amused. 
 
There is, finally, a tendency to regard all city-states as small, because they are small in 
area (e.g. Singapore again, Hong Kong, or the city-states within the German federation) – 
their populations may, however, run to several millions. Of course, precepts from some that 
are only relatively small may sometimes be useful in expanding understanding of problems 
and needs in the really small (e.g. Quah, 1999, on corruption). 
 
My research and teaching career in public administration gave me many opportunities 
to learn about, and quite often to visit, small states around the world as I developed teaching 
courses, built up my stock of teaching materials, participated in academic conferences, 
availed myself of study leave opportunities, and did the dozens of other things that become a 
part of the academic life-style. Of particular value to me were memberships of international 
public administration associations that focused particularly on the post-World-War-II 
emergence of new states out of the old colonial empires. There were several such 
associations, including the Brussels-based International Association of Schools and Institutes 
of Administration (IASIA) and the Manila-based Eastern Regional Organisation for Public 
Administration (EROPA). Much more recently, as I entered into semi-retirement, I 
discovered another such body developing with a particular interest in islands of the world, 
especially small ones, with governance issues standing as one of many pillars of its concerns: 
the International Small Island Studies Association (ISISA), which has enriched the 
understandings I brought with me from my earlier studies. 
 
The notion of statehood itself requires some reflection. As suggested above, there are 
(a) what might be considered as ‘pure’ (or ‘complete’) states, however big or small, with full 
sovereignty in a constitutional sense; and (b) states less than pure in that sense, which I have 
termed ‘quasi-states’ (which includes many of the ‘micro-states’). The quasi-states will be 
subordinate in some way to one or other of the pure states, but will themselves have 
reasonably well-developed government structures and functions recognised in some sort of 
constitutional instrument. The word ‘state’ comes easily to cover both groups, and I have 
used it in this way in the title of this essay. But, if they are islands, my quasi-states fit the 
category of ‘sub-national island jurisdictions (SNIJs)’ which has emerged in the terminology 
developed by Godfrey Baldacchino and his research collaborators (Baldacchino, 2006, 2010; 
Baldacchino and Milne, 2009). Throughout this essay, the term ‘jurisdiction’ is used from 
time to time when dealing especially with quasi-states within a general discussion of 
statehood issues. 
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Tasmanian launching pad 
 
When I commenced the formal study of public administration at the University of 
Tasmania in the 1960s, I was taught by lecturers with a mix of experiences relating to the 
British and Tasmanian administrative systems, and I was already employed as a cadet in the 
Australian Commonwealth public service where I had been acquiring knowledge of that 
system. Two lines of comparative inquiry emerged: the first seeking to understand 
similarities and differences between the British and the general Australian traditions, the 
second provoking a deeper delving into similarities and differences between the Australian 
Commonwealth and Australian state systems and between the systems of the several 
Australian states.  
 
All were Westminster-style systems, but it was soon apparent that this was a broad 
category that permitted major variations within, attributable to the circumstances of history as 
well as to differences of scale. The Commonwealth system began life fully formed when the 
Australian states federated in 1901, whereas the British and Australian state systems were 
both products of a longer evolutionary design process – though of course shorter in the 
Australian state than the British case. From this appreciation, the realisation came fairly 
quickly that it would be useful to extend the inquiry especially to other small systems 
‘emerging from the British imperial tradition’ (Braibanti, 1983), many of them sharing with 
Tasmania the experience of evolving towards self-government and statehood within the 
broadly understood Westminster pattern of parliamentary government. Of course, not all such 
systems qualified as small or as islands: it was the Tasmanian base for my inquiries that 
leaned me towards smallness and ‘islandness’. 
 
Especially significant for the comparisons I wished to draw between colonial systems 
moving to self-government were the changes that occurred in 1856 in Tasmania, up to that 
year known as Van Diemen’s Land, since 1901 a member state of the Australian federation, 
and with a current population of around 520,000 (2016 figures). An apparatus of functionally 
differentiated units had gradually emerged from the time of first British settlement in 1803-04 
(initially in separate south and north counties)3 and the formal separation from the mother 
Australian colony of New South Wales in 1825. Soon described as departments, these small 
units accounted directly to the colonial governor or, in a couple of cases, directly to their 
opposite numbers in London. In 1856, the establishment of a system of responsible 
government formally attuned to Westminster principles converted the head offices of the 
main departments into ministerial offices with responsibility direct to a reformed Tasmanian 
legislature. However, not all the departments were so affected, leaving a non-ministerialised 
residue and so unleashing never-ending speculation about the organisational character of the 
department and about the various agencies that escaped direct ministerial control. In effect, 
an overlay of political officers (the ministers) had been added to the administrative 
arrangements, whereas much of the system continued as before, not much changed, with 
public service lists developed that largely ignored these questions. Ongoing confusion has 
resulted from the failure to synchronise the ministerial/cabinet and public service components 
of the administrative system, leading to the conclusion that classic Westminster norms never 
had much bite in the Tasmanian case (Wettenhall, 1967; 1986, chs. 2-4). 
 
 
                                               
3
 There was an earlier-established indigenous population, but it was tribal and nomadic in character and had not 
developed an organised system of governance. 
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Comparisons 
 
My comparisons went in three directions. First, they showed that, while their 
experiences may have differed in detail, all the Australian states had generated similar 
ambivalence as they moved to self-government along with Tasmania in the 1850s (Western 
Australia 1890), before the principles of ministerial government had become well understood.  
 
Second, they showed that the Australian Commonwealth system established at the 
beginning of the 20th century was starkly contrasted: its designers were operating from 
scratch, with no pre-existing administrative machinery to absorb,4 and at a time when Britain 
could be observed basking in the heyday of ministerial government, with the principles of 
that system now clearly understood (Schaffer, 1957; Wettenhall, 1986, ch 2). A primary 
feature was therefore the general alignment of the ministerial and public service components 
of the Commonwealth system. Thus, whereas South Australia (the state with the most 
extreme dis-connection) could, by around 1960, boast 52 public service departments against 8 
ministers, in the Commonwealth 22 ministers faced just 24 departments whose titles 
corresponded with those of the directing ministers (Wettenhall, 1986, chs 2-3). 
 
The South Australian case was, however, instructive in another way. Ministers facing 
such a cacophony of departments needed a coordinating secretariat, and that was supplied by 
creating separate departments entrusted with providing ministers with portfolio-wide views of 
their responsibilities. Similarly in New South Wales, the need for coordination was 
recognised by the establishment of public service units described as ‘ministries’.5 Usually, 
there were pleas that portfolios should be consolidated by bringing together a minister’s areas 
of departmental responsibility in a single portfolio-matching department in the fashion 
familiar after creation of the Commonwealth system in 1901, but these pleas were mostly 
ignored (Wettenhall, 1986, chs 1, 6).  
 
Modes of ministerialisation 
 
My third quest for comparisons took me looking outwards from Australia and is of 
particular relevance to my developing interest in small states. A series of brief visits in the 
later 1960s and early 1970s to several former British territories in Africa, the Indian Ocean 
and the South Pacific, many of them relatively small in size, and associated reading, provided 
the opportunity to gather data on the extent to which structural change in the administration 
accompanied transition to self-government and/or independence, and confirmed my 
supposition that the processes I had observed in the Australian colonies were repeated in 
many such situations. Island territories in this exercise included Mauritius, Fiji, Singapore, 
the Cook Islands and (later) the Seychelles and Papua New Guinea, but I included additional 
data from Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Nigeria (not so small!). From these data, I concluded that 
the decolonising movements of the 19th and 20th centuries reflected a need for departmental 
consolidation in order to assimilate the public services to the new style of cabinet/ministerial 
government, but that this need was often recognised too slowly or scarcely at all. This was 
because the concerns of the self-government/independence movement, being predominantly 
political, failed sufficiently to consider the administrative implications of political change, 
with the result that some of the momentum of the political movement itself was lost. The 
1961 lament of one Sri Lankan (then Ceylonese) minister drew stark attention to the problem:  
                                               
4
 As part of the federal settlement, it did of course have to absorb sections of the state public services. But that 
was done within the new framework established for the Commonwealth bureaucracy. 
5 The variety of ways in which the term ‘ministry’ is used is discussed in Wettenhall (1986, ch 1). 
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Twenty-one departments are too many for even the ablest and most energetic Minister 
… He [sic] cannot give his personal attention to directing policy (cited in Cader, 
1975, pp. 98-99). 
 
I concluded further that it was possible to view the stages of ministerialisation 
actually achieved or potentially attainable in new states advancing from colonial dependency 
as forming four principal modal points on a spectrum. The first (most primitive) mode is 
represented by systems which have retained an older apparatus of administrative departments 
and made little serious attempt to adjust them to the fact of ministerial government, so that 
the number of departments is likely to be considerably in excess of the number of ministers, 
the departmental titles are unlikely to correspond fully with portfolio titles, and the ministers 
will lack portfolio-wide coordinating and secretarial services to assist them in their work. In 
the second mode there is some limited effort to integrate the area of administration forming a 
minister’s jurisdiction, through the establishment of a general secretariat to serve the 
minister; nevertheless the departments and their permanent heads are not greatly disturbed, 
and therefore remain in a strong position vis-a-vis the secretariat. The third mode goes 
considerably further in the direction of consolidation, in that, although the departments 
continue to exist as distinct and recognisable entities, they become clearly subordinate to the 
coordinating secretariat; and the permanent secretary, as the minister’s principal adviser, will 
be found at secretariat level only. In the fourth and final (most advanced) mode, the whole 
area of jurisdiction of the minister (excepting only the corporations and other arm’s-length 
bodies, about which more below) is formed into a single department: the words ‘department’ 
and ‘ministry’ become interchangeable, and the units regarded as separate departments in the 
other modes appear only as bureaux, branches, divisions or sections (Wettenhall, 1976; 1986, 
ch.8). 
 
This finding reflected my broad interest in machinery-of-government issues and was 
not size-dependent except that, from the jurisdictions I had studied, it seemed that larger 
jurisdictions were more likely to have advanced to the fourth mode. The modes were of 
course patterns, and within patterns there could be points of difference from case to case. 
Here, an observation from University of South Pacific professor David Murray reinforced 
differences I was noting. He advised those working on the design of administrative systems 
for small states to avoid simply trying to copy the systems of larger associated states. Small 
states, he advised, should adopt a strategy of ‘scaling down the prescriptions and enlarging 
the actual administrative situation’: thus, the number of departments could be ‘scaled down’ 
and the work of each ‘enlarged up’ (Murray, 1977, p. 572). 
 
With former University of Canberra colleague Ian Thynne, I looked particularly at 
some of the smallest Pacific Island states to observe how well they had innovated in 
fashioning their systems to adjust to this requirement. Nauru, Niue and Norfolk, with 
populations of under 10,000 and lacking in provincial ‘away-from-the-centre’ concerns, were 
cases in point. In each, the systems operating in Australia and New Zealand as the relevant 
‘metropolitan powers’ were followed, but in simplified form. This ‘test’ had much value as 
the circumstances of other small island states – or, more appropriately, jurisdictions – were 
considered (Thynne, 1981, 1996; Thynne and Wettenhall, 1996, 2001; Wettenhall & Thynne, 
1994; more on Norfolk Island below). 
 
Thynne had moved to Hong Kong – small in area if not in population – around the 
time of that jurisdiction’s shift from the status of a British crown colony to that of a Chinese 
‘special administrative region’ (or ‘SAR’), and its administrative machinery was considered 
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in terms of its standing on an integration-autonomy spectrum. There are positive and negative 
consequences for each position, integration making cooperative interaction but subjugation 
more likely, autonomy making dynamic self-government but isolation more likely. It was 
clear this factor needs to be taken into account in addressing the top levels of the government 
hierarchy in cases such as that of Hong Kong, where the constitutional situation is available 
for deliberate design. It is relevant more generally, in all sorts of countries, in designing the 
layers beneath the top level which position ministries, departments, agencies and so on in 
relation to each other. The implication here is that an apparatus of mode-4 ministry-
departments ought to aid the smooth working of cooperative interaction, whereas lower 
modes are more likely to produce dynamic management of particular functions (Thynne, 
1998; Thynne & Wettenhall, 2001). 
 
The question of executive-legislative relations 
Of the sub-national island jurisdictions I visited, Bermuda turned out to be a surprise 
packet, and for me it promoted some interesting connections. Bermuda claims to be one of 
Britain’s oldest self-governing colonies: its legislature dates back to 1620, and now, nearly 
400 years later and notwithstanding its emergence as a major international financial centre, it 
joins some other members of the various ‘imperial traditions’ in refusing to allow itself to be 
cut adrift from its ‘mother country’. But what interested me mostly was how its machinery of 
government had developed: for over 300 years that machinery had consisted mostly of so-
called independent boards made up of members of the legislature and responsible directly to 
that legislature. A conventional ministerial system did not come about until the 1960s 
(Wettenhall, 1975). 
 
Bermuda was not the only jurisdiction to exhibit this attachment to boards made up of 
legislative assembly members to head units of the public service; but it was the one that 
initially caught my attention. Others included some older British West Indian colonies, and 
the self-governing island jurisdictions off-shore from Britain itself: Jersey, Guernsey and Isle 
of Man. In all these cases, the processes of democratisation eventually (sometimes much 
later) led to the formation of systems of responsible government, with ministers replacing the 
boards as departmental chiefs. But the ‘discovery’ of the Bermuda case took me in two 
different directions. First, it bolstered my interest in the non-ministerial forms which usually 
supplement departments in the workings of systems of public administration: this interest was 
reflected in my doctoral research and for subsequent research projects on arms’-length 
bodies; but it was not closely related to my work on the governance of small states. And 
second, it opened up links with other small jurisdictions, notably those of the Australian 
Capital Territory (ACT) where I was now living, and Jersey in the Channel Islands. 
 
Though not surrounded by sea as is Tasmania, the ACT, with a population of around 
450,000 (2017 numbers), is itself small and surrounded by the territory of another state – 
New South Wales – and so not unreasonably can be thought of as an ‘administrative island’ 
(Wettenhall, 1998b). From the 1970s on, I found myself becoming actively involved in a 
strong campaign seeking to convert a totally dependent (on the federal bureaucracy) system 
of governance into a system falling short of statehood in the Australian federal sense but 
nevertheless possessing many of the characteristics of that statehood. This campaign 
succeeded in major respects, so the ACT became a ‘quasi-state’. Along the way, however, 
and seeking to avoid this ‘solution’, some federal ministers proposed that boards and 
commissions – not ministers – should be set up to control the ACT’s major public services 
and that community representatives should be appointed to each of them (Wettenhall, 1975, 
pp. 178-180). 
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The 1988-89 settlement went much further, and was at the same time more 
conventional by late 20th century standards (see Oakes and Reeder, 1991 and Grundy et al., 
1996 for the story of this campaign). The ACT acquired a small parliament of its own 
(Legislative Assembly), its own electoral system, government, public service (out of the 
Commonwealth service, with departments organised on mode-4 lines), and judicial 
instruments. However, the electoral system has usually returned either minority governments 
or coalitions, and this has led to suggestions – reviving the debates of the 1970s – that the 
departments should be headed by multi-party committees of the legislature rather than single 
ministers. A surprising connection with the board governance system on Jersey in the 
Channel Islands resulted, provoked by an exchange of visits with Jersey Senator Ralph Vibert 
who had had much involvement with Jersey’s legislative boards. 
 
In 1994, there were 18 such ’executive committees’ in the Jersey legislature, which 
had 53 elected members. They mostly campaigned as independents rather than as members of 
a political party, and when elected many of them were members of several committees. There 
was no cabinet, the system postulating that the assembly itself was the collective head of 
government. Civil service departments reported directly to the corresponding committees, 
and coordinating committees for finance and establishment assisted the assembly in its direct 
regulation of the total system (Vibert, 1990; Vibert & Wettenhall, 1994). 
 
There were elements of this system in other island states emerging from the British 
imperial tradition, notably Bermuda (as already noted), Sri Lanka (then Ceylon: Jeffries, 
1962), Guernsey (Loveridge, 1975), Isle of Man (Kermode, 1979), Seychelles (Allan, 1982) 
and the Channel Islands generally (Massey, 2004). They were all quite small jurisdictions, 
raising questions about whether such jurisdictions had better capacity than larger ones to 
innovate in machinery-of-government matters. However, there has been fairly general 
movement: early in Ceylon; much later in the Isle of Man and Jersey (Walker, 1989; 
Wikipedia, 2017c) away from such committee-style government and towards more 
conventional ministerial systems,6 and ACT governance came also to follow a more orthodox 
pattern of single-minister departments now called ‘directorates’. 
 
Australia’s Northern Territory, large in area but small in population (about 250,000 in 
2017), shared some governance characteristics with the ACT. In 1978 it gained its own small 
legislature, a cabinet of ministers with departments reporting to them, and other 
manifestations of a quasi-state system. The enduring ministerial-system problems that arose 
in both the Northern Territory and the ACT had to do with the small numbers of 
parliamentarians: up to 1983 in the Northern Territory case, for example, how to provide a 
six-member cabinet, an adequate government backbench and a workable opposition from the 
19 available MPs? This is a problem likely to be faced in most small jurisdictions: in the two 
Australian territories, wrestling with it has led to the enlargement of the legislatures and 
hence the pool of MPs available to cover the needed functions. 
 
Through the 1970s and ‘80s, there was much discussion in Australia about the 
possibilities of reconstructing the federation to include a larger number of state units more 
nearly equated in size, and at this time – and in the dawn of ACT and Northern Territory 
quasi-statehood – there were serious suggestions that those new systems of governance might 
provide a model for many more new federal states of the sort envisaged, possibly recognised 
as ‘regional governments’ (Power & Wettenhall, 1976, pp. 124-125). This, of course, did not 
                                               
6
 I thank Roy Le Herissier for information on the move to ministerial government in Jersey. 
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happen, and my particular interest moved to developments in an off-shore territory: Norfolk 
Island. 
 
Connections with ‘metropolitan’ powers 
 
Norfolk is a mountainous speck in the Pacific Ocean, around 1,800 km east of the 
Australian mainland coast and with a resident population hovering at around 2,000. Its 
dramatic history includes an early period (from 1788) as a secondary convict establishment 
and (from 1856) as a home for a resettled population from even smaller Pitcairn Island, made 
up of the surviving HMS Bounty mutineers and their Tahitian followers. The Pitcairner 
tradition became very important as Norfolk’s future unfolded. 
 
Through the second half of the 19th century, Norfolk was administered as a separate 
British colony sharing a governor with New South Wales (NSW) and by a small group of 
NSW officials. In 1913, with NSW now a state of the Commonwealth of Australia, Norfolk’s 
status was changed by British and Australian Commonwealth legislation to that of an 
Australian external territory, and an administrator was appointed to head the small 
government establishment on the island. But Australian official quarters proved reluctant to 
recognise the desire of the Norfolk community for a substantial degree of self-government 
and, after World War II, when it began to develop tax-haven characteristics, there was 
pressure to regulate its affairs more closely. 
 
A royal commission inquired into its circumstances in the 1970s and, after several 
compromises on the part of the federal parliament, it was advanced to a form of self-
government with its own small parliament, its own electoral system, a cabinet of ministers, a 
public service reporting to them, and some other trappings of statehood: effectively, a very 
small ‘quasi-state’. But the Commonwealth bureaucracy was unhappy with this arrangement, 
and there were several attempts to bring it into line with the mainland electoral, tax and 
welfare systems (Nimmo, 1976; Grundy & Wettenhall, 1977; Wettenhall & Grundy, 1992). 
In the early 21st century, the form of governance again came under serious review, with the 
Commonwealth determined to remove Norfolk’s self-government and Norfolk interests 
fighting strongly but unsuccessfully to avoid a downgrade of its governance status. Along 
with Christmas Island and the Cocos Islands, Australian off-shore territories in the Indian 
Ocean, it found itself restructured effectively as a local government in the municipal system 
of one of Australia’s federal states (Stanhope, Wettenhall & Bhusal, 2015; Wettenhall, 2016). 
 
Norfolk fitted the category of ‘sub-national island jurisdictions’ (SNIJs). I had been 
employed in the early 1990s, with journalist colleague Phillip Grundy, as a consultant to the 
Norfolk Island Government in its fight against stronger Commonwealth intervention, and had 
developed a keen interest in such jurisdictions. My coverage included many SNIJs emerging 
from the British imperial tradition, but was especially important for me because it also 
included islands representative of the French, Dutch and other colonial imperial traditions. I 
had soon come to see that I needed to travel more widely in my explorations. Tasmanian 
origins had provided a useful start, but the world had much more to offer!  
 
In reviewing an important text (Aldrich & Connell, 1992; Wettenhall, 1993), I 
recorded two personal experiences that alerted me particularly to the very different 
arrangement that had developed in the old French colonial network. The first occurred as I 
was flying in a small passenger plane between Barbados and St Lucia in the Caribbean. I 
knew the plane was flying on to other islands in the Caribbean after St Lucia. A coloured 
woman with good English and dressed rather as a bureaucrat sat beside me, and I asked her 
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what her destination was. She replied: ‘France’. ‘Oh!’, I said, ‘where do you change for the 
cross-Atlantic flight?’ She gave me a withering look – I was obviously a Caribbean ignorant 
– and replied: ‘I don’t!’ A little later I plucked up courage and resumed the conversation. It 
turned out that her ‘France’ was Martinique, the next island in the chain. She had lived in the 
Caribbean all her life, and had never been to Europe. But European France, she explained, 
kept her island abundantly supplied with all things French, so that she believed herself fully 
equal to citizens of metropolitan France, and was proud to call herself French. 
 
The second: a Christmas message from an American friend told me that he and his 
family had had a driving holiday that took them to three countries: from the US, through 
Canada, to France. Did they drive across the Atlantic? Not a bit of it. Their France was St 
Pierre et Miquelon, two islands a few kilometers off the Newfoundland coast and connected 
to it by vehicular ferry.  
 
These exchanges led me to look more closely at the French arrangements, and it 
became clear that over a dozen territories around the world under French sovereignty existed 
in this way. They had their own governments and electoral systems and, unlike SNIJs 
emerging from the British tradition, they were also directly represented in the metropolitan 
parliament. In populations, they ranged from around 860,000 (Réunion in the Indian Ocean) 
to just over 6,000 (St Pierre et Miquelon in the Atlantic). New Caledonia was separately 
arranged following a violent pro-independence uprising in the 1980s, and after a political 
compromise awaits a future constitutional settlement (Aldrich and Connell, 1992, ch.8).7 
 
These French dispositions are unusual in today’s world. International post-colonial 
history has usually followed a fairly regular two-directional path. In the first, through to about 
1984 and beginning with the case of Iceland (representing the Danish imperial tradition) 
receiving its independence in 1944, there was a steady procession of former colonies 
benefitting from the attentions of the United Nations Decolonisation Committee (the so-
called ‘Committee of 24’), acquiring full sovereignty, and moving out of the old empires. In 
the second, however, from about 1984 the remaining former colonies have showed 
considerable reluctance to accept independence, notwithstanding the wish of their colonial 
masters; through numerous referendum exercises, they have voiced a preference to remain 
formally associated with their former masters in ways that bring economic and other tangible 
benefits. Another scholar of small states employs the category of ‘partially independent 
territories’ to cover such arrangements, noting that these may furnish important capabilities, 
leading more easily to wealth and security than full independence (Rezvani, 2014). 
 
These are examples of ‘island sub-nationalism’, or ‘autonomy without sovereignty’ 
(Baldacchino, 2004; Baldacchino & Milne, 2009). Bermuda (already noted), Gibraltar 
(almost an island), the Caymans and British Virgin Islands, St Helena, the Falklands and 
others not mentioned in this essay are cases-in-point out of the British imperial tradition. 
Thus, in his account of travels through ‘the torrid zone’ (the tropics), Alexander Frater shows 
how determinedly Anguillans campaigned against Britain’s desire to unload them, and how 
winning that campaign brought them many benefits (Frater, 2005, pp. 271-274). 
 
                                               
7
 Aldrich and Connell (1992) offer a major account of the system that France has provided for its overseas 
territories. In another book significant to small state studies, they have examined the remaining colonies in the 
dwindling empires, and provide an excellent source of information about territories missed in my journey, such 
as the cases of the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on the Moroccan coast (Aldrich & Connell, 1998). 
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A somewhat more complex example is provided by the collection of Dutch Caribbean 
islands out of the Netherlands imperial tradition. Indonesia and Suriname, neither of them 
islands (though Indonesia has plenty of them, of course), had gained their sovereign 
independence in the first decolonising wave. The Dutch Caribbean islands experienced 
change but not independence in the second wave. They fall into two groups, northern and 
mostly English-speaking, and southern and mostly Dutch-speaking, each comprising three 
main islands and one of them, Sint Maarten in the north sharing its island with the French 
territory of St Martin. Curaçao was long seen as the lead island, and in the 1800s the others 
were governed as its dependencies. But that was not generally popular, and the Netherlands 
government made several unsuccessful attempts to organise the islands into a Dutch 
Caribbean federation. In constitutional settlements in the earlier 20th century, Curaçao and its 
dependencies became an integral part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands known as the 
Netherlands Antilles. In the context of marked differences between the islands, the ‘kingdom’ 
aspect had more bite than any attempt to federate.  
 
Through the 1970s and early ‘80s, the Dutch government saw independence as the 
best solution to on-going relationship issues, but it was repeatedly thwarted in securing that 
goal, not least by a series of island referenda. In 1986, Aruba separated from the Netherlands 
Antilles as a political entity, and was recognized as a distinct ‘country’ within the kingdom. 
That model proved popular: when, in 2005, all islands were asked to exercise their right of 
self-determination, Sint Maarten and Curaçao chose autonomy as separate ‘countries’ within 
the kingdom, like Aruba. Saba, Bonaire and St Eustatius chose instead to join the Dutch 
metropolitan local government system, and so became part of the ‘country’ of the 
Netherlands. As from October 2010, the entity known as the Netherlands Antilles was wound 
up. The Kingdom of the Netherlands now consists of four autonomous constituent countries, 
three of them in the Caribbean. The three Caribbean special municipalities are part of the 
European Netherlands (Kersell, 1994; Veenendaal, 2015; Tange, 2017). 
 
There are other former-empire networks that include island jurisdictions with varying 
degrees of local autonomy, the cases of Denmark (the Faroes and, with large area but small 
population, Greenland), Finland (the Åland Islands), Portugal (Azores, Madeira), Spain 
(Canary Islands) and the US (American Samoa, Guam, Northern Marianas, Puerto Rico, US 
Virgin Islands) coming easily to mind. Governance arrangements differ from one to the other; 
their study is an important part of the ISISA mission.  
 
In some cases, the SNIJ may be a full and co-equal federal state, such as Hawai'i (in 
the USA), Prince Edward Island (in Canada) and Tasmania. In some, it may be an ‘associate 
state’, dissolvable by either party acting alone on terms established in a constitutional 
document or treaty, as with Niue and Cook Islands in relation to New Zealand; in others it 
may be a regular province of the associated nation-state, as Galápagos is to Ecuador. In yet 
others, as with the new status of three of the Dutch Caribbean islands, it may be a nearly-
regular component of the nation-state’s local government system. In the Australian case, the 
three off-shore SNIJs, Norfolk, Christmas and Cocos, have had all pretensions to a degree of 
self-government removed, with their status now ‘demoted’ to that of a local government 
within the municipal system of one of the federal states. 
 
What matters in comparing the constitutional arrangements of SNIJs is the degree of 
autonomy they enjoy in their relationships with their central powers, and measuring 
autonomy involves judging degrees of autonomy against degrees of partnership between the 
island jurisdiction and those powers. Where a reasonable degree of autonomy is wanted by 
the SNIJ, maximising available autonomy options will require that the SNIJ is able to 
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demonstrate good ‘para-diplomacy’ capacity, and this requires strength in its own governance 
arrangements (Bartmann, 2009; Watts, 2009).  
From islands to land-locked jurisdictions 
 
This account of my journey through the governance arrangements of small states has 
focused mainly on island jurisdictions. As noted, a few coastal tracts with large hinterlands – 
such as Greenland, French Guiana and Australia’s Northern Territory – have revealed similar 
characteristics. And it may be assumed that land-locked jurisdictions emerging from similar 
imperial traditions will mostly share such characteristics: thus Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, 
Zimbabwe and Uganda may be expected to have behaved broadly, in basic machinery-of-
government terms, in the same way as their island cousins from the British tradition. 
 
From the early days of my travelling, however, I have been aware of another group of 
small but (with one exception) land-locked jurisdictions not coming out of the same imperial 
traditions but requiring to be fitted into the small states story. These are the so-called ‘little 
countries of Europe’ (AGS, 1969), which – if we exclude the Roman Catholic church state of 
the Vatican City (or Holy See), whose ecumenical basis removes it from comparability with 
all the others – number five: Andorra, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco and San Marino. 
 
Luxembourg is the largest of the five, with a 2016 population of just over half a 
million, a little more than Tasmania, with an area of 2,586 km2. Andorra is the next largest, 
with about 70,000 people in 468 km2. The rest are smaller: Liechtenstein: some 37,000 
people in 160 km2; Monaco: also some 37,000 people, but in only about two km2; and San 
Marino: about 32,000 people in just over 60 km2. 
 
Except for republican San Marino, all have monarchical styles of government styled 
loosely as principalities in the Andorra, Liechtenstein and Monaco cases and grand duchy in 
Luxembourg. Andorra has joint princes serving as head of state, the President of France and 
the Catholic Bishop of Urgel, a neighbouring Spanish province; in the others, princes or a 
grand duke serve as heads of state. In San Marino, the legislature elects two Captains Regent 
who serve jointly as both head of state and head of government. There are other unusual 
features in the governing arrangements, but electoral systems ensure that all governments are 
broadly representative of their peoples. All five are members of the United Nations in their 
own right; while Luxembourg is a member state of the European Union (EU).  
 
Unlike many of the island states and quasi-states, these land-locked states (and 
Monaco) have sound economies, operating variously as financial centres (sometimes with 
tax-haven status), with gambling (notably Monaco’s casino) and tourist enterprises 
flourishing. Remarkably, Liechtenstein claims to be the world’s leading manufacturer of false 
teeth (Van Huygen, 2015). Unlike small jurisdictions in vast oceans, they are in no sense 
isolated, and experience myriads of interactions with their larger neighbours. Analysing those 
interactions seems to be a major research challenge, and provides points of contrast between 
geographical island jurisdictions and these small land-locked polities. 
 
‘Islandness’: a cautionary note  
 
The notion of ‘islandness’ emerges strongly in considering the governance condition 
of small (and to a degree isolated) jurisdictions, whether or not actually surrounded by                                                
water. Studies of “the social, economic and political dimensions of formality and informality 
in ‘island’ communities” (Skinner and Hills, 2006) attest to the unsuitability of applying 
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models developed in larger locales to the condition of smaller ones. So often, those involved 
in administrative reform and development in small jurisdictions bring with them Western 
notions of a division between political and bureaucratic elements of governance. But this 
model cannot work, and needs adjusting, in societies where ‘everybody knows everybody’, 
and family and kin cohesiveness provide the basis political dynamic. In these societies, 
traditions of shared ownership often apply, there is little social distance between ‘leaders’ and 
those they govern, almost every adult in employment is employed by government, and in best 
‘pooh-bah’ fashion every official performs several roles, criss-crossing and confounding lines 
of responsibility (Murray, 1985, pp. 187-201; Corbett, 2013, pp. 1-21).  
 
It is a bit trite to say that Aristotle understood this large-small difference very well. 
Conclusion 
 
The journey described in this essay has pulled together two areas of study that have 
captured my interest over a long academic career: public administration, now often going 
under the broader term ‘governance’, and the world of small and island states. As indicated, 
the journey began in one such state, Tasmania, and in a variety of ways it has taken me to, or 
otherwise introduced me to, many others. 
 
There are of course tens of thousands of islands around the world. My concern has 
been with those that have settled populations, these populations to be found in various stages 
of development leading towards systems of organised government, with statehood as a fairly 
advanced stage of such development. Geological, meteorological, biological and other natural 
forces have shaped these islands and helped determine the basic character of their 
populations; economic and political forces have followed, with indigenous customs and 
beliefs, where they have existed, themselves evolving, and this process so often moderated by 
the influence of usually larger mentor states. Many have spent long periods functioning as 
dependencies or colonies of major empires, hosting the imperial traditions that have produced 
a degree of similarity across the governance systems of their subjects. Sameness has been 
elusive, however, and it is rare to find exact replicas existing anywhere through this world of 
small state and territorial systems of government. 
 
They exist in many types of relationships with other states big and small. With some, 
they have historical links, with others they may share borders; but a degree of separateness is 
common. They come and go as larger entities in the international arena develop expansionist 
political objectives and battle among themselves to secure those objectives. They stay 
sometimes as satellites of those larger states, sometimes as irritants in the international 
political scene, quite frequently as the creations of small communities seeking genuinely to 
preserve their own traditions and mind their own business amid the complexities of the wider 
world. However, as a species they never disappear from the world map. 
 
If we think in terms of jurisdictions rather than constitutional states, the observations 
of Aristotle made 24 or 25 centuries ago (noted in the Introduction to this essay) fit well 
enough with those developed more recently. All jurisdictions need to have arrangements in 
place to service certain functions, but size will determine how often those arrangements need 
to be operationalised or how professional the servicing needs to be. Of course, more 
distinguishing tests can now be applied: for example, non-sovereign and subnational island 
jurisdictions can exist alongside sovereign ones; ministerial systems can exist alongside non-
ministerial ones, though it has to be said that democratic urgings in many places have more 
recently favoured the ministerial ones. My searches through the 1970s identified several 
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versions of ministerial arrangements marked by the structures of public service departmental 
systems headed by those ministers. They identified questions about patterns of relationships 
between executive governments and legislatures that surfaced in so many small jurisdictions, 
and questions also about types of connections with ‘metropolitan powers’ whose empires 
have so often, at some time or another, housed small jurisdictions – including questions about 
degrees of autonomy possessed by the latter.  
 
The smallness factor is not the only one which influences the shape of these 
arrangements; but it is clearly an important one. Analysis shows that such issues arise in 
almost all small jurisdictions, and comparing arrangements from jurisdiction to jurisdiction 
provides a rich field for on-going research. 
 
References 
 
Abjorensen, N. (1998, July 7). Independence smiles on tiny Estonia. Canberra Times. 
 
AGS (American Geographical Society) (1969). Five Little Countries of Europe, New York, 
NY: Nelson Doubleday. 
 
Aldrich, R., and Connell, J. (1992). France’s overseas frontier: departements et territoires 
d’outre-mer, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Aldrich, R., and Connell, J. (1998). The last colonies. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Allan, C. (1982). Constitution making in new island states, Auckland, New Zealand: Legal 
Research Foundation. 
 
Aristotle in 1946 translation. Book IV: Actual constitutions and their varieties, in Ernest 
Barker, The politics of Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Baker, R. A. (Ed.). (1992). Public administration in small and island states. West Hartford, 
CT: Kumarian Press. 
 
Baldacchino, G. (2006). Innovative development strategies from non-sovereign island 
jurisdictions. World Development, 34(5), 852-867. 
 
Baldacchino, G. 2010. Island enclaves: off-shore strategies, creative governance, and sub-
national island jurisdictions, Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
 
Baldacchino, G., and Milne, D (Eds.). (2009). The case for non-sovereignty: lessons from 
sub-national island jurisdictions, London: Routledge. 
 
Bartmann, B. (2009). In or out: sub-national island jurisdictions and the antechamber of para-
diplomacy. In G. Baldacchino & D. Milne (Eds.), The case for non-sovereignty: 
lessons from sub-national island jurisdictions, (pp. 63-72). London: Routledge. 
 
Braibanti, R. (Ed.). (1983). Asian bureaucratic systems emergent from the British imperial 
tradition. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.  
 
           A journey through small state governance 
 
 125
Cader, M. (1975). State industrial corporations in Sri Lanka. Unpublished MA thesis, 
Canberra: Australian National University. 
 
Clesse, A., and Knudsen, O. (Eds.). (1996). Small states and the security challenge in the new 
Europe. London: Brassey’s. 
 
Collins, P., and Warrington, E. (1997). The new public administration: lessons from the 
experiences of small and island states. Report on the Seychelles/ CAPAM/ IASIA 
Conference, April. Toronto, ON: Commonwealth Association of Public 
Administration and Management. 
 
Corbett, J. (2013). ‘Everybody knows everybody’: practising politics in the Pacific islands. 
Democratization, 22(1), 1-21. 
 
Frater, A. (2005). Tales from the torrid zone: travels in the deep tropics, London: Picador. 
 
Goetschel, L. (Ed.). (1998). Small states inside and outside the European Union: interests 
and policies, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer. 
 
Grundy, P., and Wettenhall, R. (1977). Norfolk Island versus the Nimmo Report. Current 
Affairs Bulletin (Sydney), 54(5), 17-25. 
 
Grundy, P., Oakes, B., Reeder, L., and Wettenhall, R. (1996). Reluctant democrats: the 
transition to self-government in the Australian Capital Territory. Canberra, Australia: 
Federal Capital Press. 
 
Jeffries, J. (1962). Ceylon: the path to independence. London: Pall Mall Press. 
 
Kermode, D. (1979). Devolution at work: a case study of the Isle of Man. Farnborough: 
Saxon House. 
 
Kersell, J. (1994). The potential of a ‘Northern Windward Islands’: an alternative in the north 
to the Netherlands Antilles. Asian Journal of Public Administration, 16(1), 41-59. 
 
Lee, K. (1993). Diplomacy of a tiny state, 2nd edn, Singapore: World Scientific. 
 
Loveridge, J. (1975). The constitution and law of Guernsey. St Peter Port, Guernsey: La 
Société Guernesiaise. 
 
March, J., and Simon, H. (1958). Organizations, New York, NY: Wiley.  
 
Massey, A. (2004). Modernising government in the Channel Islands. Public Administration, 
82(1), 422-443. 
 
Miroff, N. (2017, July 9). Uruguay going to pot … literally. Sunday Canberra Times, p. 14. 
 
Murray, D. (1977). A problem in the administrative development of small island states. In 
S.K. Sharma (Ed.) Dynamics of development: an international perspective, (pp. 570-
584). Delhi, India: Concept Publishing Co. 
 
R. Wettenhall 
 
 
126
Murray, D. (1987). Public administration in the microstates of the Pacific. In E.C. Dommen 
& P.L. Hein (Eds.), States, microstates and islands (pp. 185-203). London: Croom 
Helm. 
 
Nimmo, J. (1976). Report of the Royal Commission into matters relating to Norfolk Island. 
Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service. 
 
Oakes, W. K., and Reeder, L. J. (Eds.). (1991). Governing the two Canberras: Canberra as 
federal capital and Canberra as a place to live. Canberra, Australia: University of 
Canberra. 
 
O’Rourke, P. (1988). Holidays in hell. London: Picador. 
 
Oyun, S. (1999). Developing a national anti-corruption strategy: perspective of an economy 
in transition. Paper to World Conference on Governance, Manila, 31 May-4 June. 
 
Pirotta, G. A. (1996). The Maltese public service 1800-1940: the administrative politics of a 
micro-state, Msida, Malta: Mireva. 
 
Pirotta, G., Wettenhall, R., and Briguglio, L. (Eds.), (2001). Symposium on the governance of 
small jurisdictions. Public Organization Review, 1(2). 
 
Power, J., and Wettenhall, R. (1976). Regional government versus regional programmes. 
Australian Journal of Public Administration, 35(2), 114-129. 
 
Quah, J. (1999). Comparing anti-corruption measures in asian countries: lessons to be learnt. 
Paper presented at World Congress on Governance, Manila, 31 May-4 June. 
 
Raadschelders, J. (1992). Definitions of smallness: a comparative study. In R.A. Baker (Ed.) 
Public administration in small and island states, (pp. 26-33). West Hartford, CT: 
Kumarian Press. 
 
Rezvani, D. (2014). Surpassing the sovereign state, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Rowat, D. (1991). Canberra in international perspective. In W.K. Oakes & L.J. Reeder (Eds.), 
Governing the two Canberras: Canberra as federal capital and Canberra as a place 
to live, (pp. 28-45). Canberra, Australia: University of Canberra.  
 
Schaffer, B. (1957). The idea of the ministerial department: Bentham, Mill and Bagehot. 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, 3(1), 60-78. 
 
Schwartz, H. (1994). Small states in big trouble: state reorganization in Australia, Denmark, 
New Zealand and Sweden in the 1980s. World Politics, 46(4), 527-555. 
 
Skinner, J., and Hills, M. (2006). Managing island life: social, economic and political 
dimensions of formality and informality in ‘island’ communities. Dundee, Scotland: 
University of Abertay Press. 
 
Stanhope, J., Wettenhall, R., and Bhusal, T. (2015). Governance challenge: Australia’s Indian 
Ocean island territories. Asia-Pacific Journal of Public Administration, 38(2), 87-102. 
           A journey through small state governance 
 
 127
 
Tange, L. (2017). A comparative study of the autonomy arrangement of the former 
Netherland Antilles in relation to the Åland example. Journal of Autonomy and 
Security Studies, 1(1), 76-113. 
 
Thynne, I. (1981). The ministerial system on Niue. Public Administration and Development, 
1(1), 47-54. 
 
Thynne, I. (1996). Public administration in troubled waters: organisations, management and a 
New ‘Oceania’. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 55(2), 47-53. 
 
Thynne, I. (1998). ‘One country’ or ‘two systems’? Integration and autonomy in perspective. 
In I. Scott (Ed.), Political transition and institutional change in Hong Kong, (pp. 234-
247). London: Macmillan. 
 
Thynne, I., and Wettenhall, R. (1996). Innovation in leadership structures in small and island 
states. Paper presented at 5th Pacific Islands Political Studies Association conference, 
Airai, Palau, December. 
 
Thynne, I., and Wettenhall, R. (2001). Understanding small-states governance: an emerging 
field. In A. Farazmand (Ed.) Handbook of comparative and development public 
administration, 2nd edn. (pp. 643-654). New York, NY: Marcel Dekker.  
 
Van Huygen, M. (2015). Thirteen fascinating little facts about Liechtenstein. Mental Floss, 
October. 
  
Veenendaal, W. (2015). The Dutch Caribbean municipalities in comparative perspective. 
Island Studies Journal, 10(1), 15-30. 
 
Vibert, R. (1990). Parliament without parties: the committee system in the States of the island 
of Jersey, St Helier: States of Jersey. 
 
Vibert, R., and Wettenhall, R. (1994). Using all the talents of a legislature in governing: a 
conversation. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 53(1), 107-115. 
 
Walker, M. (Chief Minister, Isle of Man) (1989). Aspects of the constitution of the Isle of 
Man: the position of the governor and the development of a council of ministers, 
Douglas: Executive Council of the Isle of Man. 
 
Warrington, E. (1994). A capacity for policy management: re-appraising the context in 
microstates. Asian Journal of Public Administration, 16(1), 109-133. 
 
Warrington, E. (Ed.). (1994). Symposium on the governance of small and island states. Asian 
Journal of Public Administration, 16(1). 
 
Watts, R (2009). Island jurisdictions in comparative constitutional perspective. In G. 
Baldacchino & D. Milne (Eds.), The case for non-sovereignty: lessons from sub-
national island jurisdictions, (pp. 21-39). London: Routledge. 
 
Wettenhall, R. (1967). Evolution of a departmental system: a Tasmanian commentary, 
Hobart, Australia: University of Tasmania. 
R. Wettenhall 
 
 
128
 
Wettenhall, R. (1975). Bermuda boards: lessons for Canberra. Public Administration 
(Sydney), 34(2), 171-182. 
 
Wettenhall, R. (1976). Modes of ministerialisation. Public Administration, 54(1), 1-20; 54(4), 
425-451. 
 
Wettenhall, R. (1986). Organising government; the uses of ministries and departments. 
Sydney, Australia: Croom Helm. 
 
Wettenhall, R. (1993). Review of Aldrich & Connell 1992. In Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, 52(1), 132-133. 
 
Wettenhall, R. (1997). The microstates of Micronesia. Paper presented at IASIA Annual 
Conference, Quebec, July. 
 
Wettenhall, R. (1998a). Governing the ACT as a small quasi-state. Canberra Bulletin of 
Public Administration, 87, 8-20. 
 
Wettenhall, R. (1998b). The external relations of a small quasi-state within a federal system: 
the case of the Australian Capital Territory. Public Administration and Development, 
18(2), 123-139.  
 
Wettenhall, R. (1999, May 13). City-state would benefit by looking to non-Australian models 
for development. Canberra Times. 
 
Wettenhall, R. (2016). Decolonising though integration: Australia’s offshore island 
territories. Island Studies Journal, 11(2), 715-728. 
 
Wettenhall, R., and Grundy, P. (1992). Norfolk Island and the electorate of Canberra: 
community of interest? Consultants’ report to the Norfolk Island Government. 
 
Wettenhall, R., and Thynne, I. (1994). Machinery of government innovation in microstates: 
the Cases of Nauru, Niue and Norfolk Island. Asian Journal of Public Administration, 
16(1), 60-86. 
 
Wikipedia (2017a). List of countries by population (United Nations), last edited 22 June 
2017. 
 
Wikipedia (2017b). Member states of the Commonwealth of Nations, last edited 25 February 
2017. 
 
Wikipedia (2017c). Politics of Jersey, last edited 25 June 2017. 
